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Abstract
Background: Over recent years there have been several major terror attacks in cities across Europe. These attacks
result in deaths, physical injuries, and pose long-term threats to mental health and wellbeing of large populations.
Although psychologists have completed important work on mental health responses to disaster exposure including
terrorist attacks, the mental health impacts of such attacks have been comparatively less examined in academic
literature than the acute health response to physical injuries. This paper reflects on Southwark Council’s pioneering
public mental health response to the June 2017 terror attack at London Bridge and Borough Market. It aims to
explore perceptions of the mental health impact of the incident by those living and working in the borough.
Methods: A rapid qualitative evaluation informed by the logic underpinning Southwark Council’s response was
conducted. Seven formative interviews were undertaken with individuals involved in the response planning and/or
delivery, enabling the evaluation team to establish the response’s theoretical basis. Subsequently, nineteen semi-
structured interviews with consenting Council employees, residents, business owners, and workers from the
Borough were conducted to understand perceived mental health impacts of the attack and the success of the
Council response. Thematic analysis of transcribed interviews was undertaken to evaluate the extent to which the
response was implemented successfully.
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Results: Participants reported feeling the attack had a wide-reaching negative impact on the mental health of
residents, those working in the borough and visitors who witnessed the attack. Delivering the response was a
challenge and response visibility within the community was limited. Participants suggested a comprehensive
systematic approach to health needs assessment informed by knowledge and relationships of key Council workers
and community stakeholders is imperative when responding to terrorist incidents. Improved communication and
working relationships between statutory organisations and community stakeholders would ensure community
groups are better supported. Prioritising mental health needs of terror attack responders to mitigate persisting
negative impacts was highlighted.
Conclusions: This article highlights a potential public health approach and need for developing robust practical
guidance in the aftermath of terror attacks. This approach has already influenced the response to the Christchurch
mosque shooting in 2019.
Keywords: Terror attack, Mental health, Qualitative research, Public health
Background
Over recent years there have been a number of violent
attacks that have targeted civilians in major cities in Eur-
ope and elsewhere. The most notable of these include
the November 2015 Paris (France) attacks (including the
Bataclan Theatre) that resulted in 130 deaths, the truck
attack in Nice (France) in July 2016 which left 87 people
dead, the Manchester Arena (United Kingdom) bombing
that killed 23 in May 2017, and the Christchurch (New
Zealand) shootings that led to 51 fatalities [1–3, 14]. The
immediate physical harm caused by terror attacks are
managed by emergency blue-light services using well-
established protocols. However, such incidents also have
longer term impacts on the mental health and wellbeing
of a much larger population [1]. Indeed, it is through
this sense of long-term anxiety that terror targets under-
mine the mental health and wellbeing of the target
population. Despite being widespread and long lasting,
these effects are less tangible and protocols to deal with
them are less well-established since they have attracted
comparatively little academic research [2]. It is crucial
that learning is derived from responding to terrorist at-
tacks and other major incidents to improve future man-
agement of such events [2, 3]. This article examines the
innovative approach pioneered by Southwark Council’s
Public Health team who sought to characterise and miti-
gate the mental health and wellbeing effects of the
London Bridge and Borough Market terror attack that
occurred on 3 June 2017 [4].
The incident took place at ten o’clock on a Saturday
evening amid the busy bars, restaurants and nightlife
found adjacent to the River Thames in the centre of
London, United Kingdom. The attackers drove their van
into pedestrians on London Bridge before the three at-
tackers proceeded to the Borough Market area on foot,
where they attacked people with knives. Eight members
of the public were killed, and the three attackers shot
dead by London’s Metropolitan Police. A further forty-
eight people received hospital treatment for physical in-
juries, twenty-one of these in critical condition [5].
In addition to the fatalities and direct physical injuries,
there were approximately 850 witnesses and between
1000 and 3000 people were evacuated from the area.
Following the attack, police cordoned off Borough Mar-
ket and the surrounding streets. Two hundred and
twenty-eight businesses were in the initial wider police
cordon and 50 in the inner cordon. Much of the cordon
was lifted on Wednesday 7 June but the Borough Market
area (home to many market stalls, eateries and drinking
venues) did not re-open until Wednesday 14 June – 11
days after the attack. Beyond these tangible conse-
quences, it is clear that the attacks caused considerable
distress, characterised by psychopathology symptoms
and unpleasant emotions (but not classified as a psychi-
atric disorder) to the population in Southwark and be-
yond [1, 3]. The leader of Southwark Council wrote that
this was “an attack on the diversity we celebrate - the
mix of nationalities drawn to our borough – and the
great pleasure we take in our restaurants, bars and mar-
kets” [6].
Evidence base
Research into the mental health impacts of terror attacks
shows they are difficult to quantify [3]. Factors including
proximity to the attack, previous mental health issues,
heightened media use, and previous exposure may cause
more adverse outcomes related to post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), post-traumatic stress symptoms
(PTSS), prolonged grief disorder (PGD), and insomnia
[7–12]. Those trained to respond to a terror attack, as
well as those with certain personality dispositions, are
less likely to experience mental health consequences fol-
lowing an incident. Those who have previously experi-
enced a terror attack, been highly exposed to subsequent
Jumbe et al. BMC Public Health         (2021) 21:1427 Page 2 of 12
media coverage, and volunteers with no professional res-
cue training or experience are more likely to suffer nega-
tive mental health consequences such as PTSD and
PTSS [13, 14]. Empirically confirmed successful mental
health interventions include preparedness programmes,
cognitive behaviour therapy, exposure narratives, and
eye movement desensitization and reprocessing [15–17].
The evidence base for the effectiveness of psychological
first aid as a post-disaster intervention remains inconclu-
sive [15].
Research into psychosocial outcomes indicates that the
clinical presentations of PTSD following terror attacks
are often complex [1, 4]. There may be long-term nega-
tive impacts on survivors, their family members and at
times the wider community. Work, education, and per-
sonal and social lives are often negatively impacted [18,
19]. Generalised trust of other people may also be af-
fected [20]. Involvement in community activities may
buffer adverse psychosocial outcomes [21].
Research on individual- and community-level out-
comes demonstrates that an individual’s behaviour to
others may become more altruistic but individuals and
community economic potential suffers [22–25]. There
are also demographic differences related to gender, race,
and religion in individuals’ responses to terrorism that
should not be ignored when seeking to understand and
respond to such events [26–28]. Research on terror at-
tacks and community resilience suggests that stake-
holders should promote community resilience because it
is linked to a wide range of positive outcomes, as well as
being protective against negative outcomes for commu-
nities and individuals [29–34]. Finally, there is also evi-
dence that overzealous mental health and wellbeing
responses in terms of reviewing trauma in detail and at
length on the same day it is experienced may be disadvan-
tageous in relation to psychological health outcomes [35].
This inconclusive review of the published evidence
demonstrates the need for more research, emphasised by
the important knowledge gap surrounding how public
health professional may work to mitigate mental health
and wellbeing impacts of terror attacks, as opposed to
humanitarian emergencies more generally [2]. This re-
view also suggests Southwark Council were delivering an
innovative and challenging programme of work very rap-
idly in the context of very limited evidence and
guidance.
This paper reports findings from a commissioned
rapid qualitative evaluation which aimed to: 1) under-
stand how this terror attack impacted on the mental
health and wellbeing of Southwark Council community
and the process of implementing the response; 2) de-
scribe and explore the usefulness/value of Southwark
Council’s public health response; and 3) contribute to
the body of knowledge on this topic to inform
development of best practice guidance for local govern-
ment organisations who might face similar situations.
Methods
Design
We conducted a qualitative evaluation of Southwark
Council’s public health response to the London Bridge
terror attack, within the London Borough of Southwark.
This evaluation, commissioned over a 3-month period,
involved two phases. Firstly, formative semi-structured
interviews with key informants who were Southwark
Council employees or statutory service employees in-
volved in the response to gain an in-depth understand-
ing of the response, how and why it was delivered. Phase
two involved interviews with adults from the Borough’s
community i.e., local business leaders, their employees
or Southwark Council residents, to explore their views
of the mental health impact of the attack, the value of
the response and the process of implementing the re-
sponse. Evaluating the impact of the response on the
mental health of those who received it was outside the
scope of the evaluation.
Sampling and recruitment
This study received ethical approval from the Queen
Mary Ethics of Research Committee on 23 May 2018
[QMERC2018/35]. Following this, four researchers (one
male; three females) from Queen Mary University of
London (QMUL) approached individuals by email or
telephone about the commissioned study.
The first seven interviews were formative in nature
and were conducted with Southwark Council employees
directly involved in the planning and/or delivery of the
mental health and wellbeing response (see Fig. 1A). The
aim of these interviews was to develop an understanding
of aims of the response, the appropriateness and success
of which would then be explored in further semi-
structured interviews with people who lived or worked
in the Borough. There was no relationship between re-
searchers and these participants prior to the research
and the participants were all identified by Southwark
Council as individuals who were deeply involved in de-
livering the mental health response. QMUL researchers
contacted the potential interviewees via email, explaining
the project and asking if they wanted to participate,
while making it clear that they were not obliged to do
so. Participants were informed both in the participant
information sheet and verbally by QMUL researchers
that the study purpose was to understand the strengths
and weaknesses of the Council’s public mental health re-
sponse to the terror attack. We hoped to achieve this by
interviewing a variety of people who implemented or
were exposed to the response. These interviews, com-
bined with an analysis of response documentation
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acquired from Southwark Council’s Public Health Team
by AM and JK, informed an understanding of the evi-
dence and logic underpinning the Council’s response ac-
tivities and the conditions under which it was developed.
They also informed the design of the interview protocol
for the further interviews with local residents’ commu-
nity leaders, business owners and workers.
After this formative evaluation stage, 25 local resi-
dents, workers, businesspeople and community members
were then approached for interview. Those willing to
participate responded to provide written informed con-
sent and arrange an interview with researchers at a date
and time of their convenience. Nineteen out of the
twenty-five individuals approached agreed to participate.
Out of the six who did not participate, three did not re-
spond to the email and one was on annual leave. The
other two declined because they were too busy with
organising the incident’s one year anniversary activities,
which was near the time the interviewes were
conducted.
As mentioned previously, understanding garnered from
the seven formative interviews informed the questions used
in interviews conducted with members of the local commu-
nity (local business owners, Southwark Council employees,
Southwark residents and community leaders, head teachers,
and police officers) who had lived experiences of the terror
attack (see Fig. 1B). In these interviews they provided their
experiences living through the terror attack, and insights into
how the incident impacted the mental health and wellbeing
of their community. Furthermore, because part of Southwark
Council’s response to the crisis included attempting to
understand and meet the mental health needs of the com-
munity, participants in the second round of interviews pro-
vided their views on how visible, effective or helpful the
Council’s response was. It should be noted that the aim of
these interviews was not to ascertain the effectiveness of the
response; instead they aimed to explore the extent to which
the logic underpinning the response related to the experi-
ences and perceptions of the participants and their views on
how it was implemented.
Fig. 1 A Formative Inteview schedulel. B Stakeholder Interview schedule (condensed)
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Purposive sampling aimed at recruiting a diverse range
of people for the subsequent interviews was used to ob-
tain wide ranging narratives from the community [36].
There were no incentives or compensation for study
participation. Key characteristics of the sample are pre-
sented in Table 1.
Data collection
All but three interviews were conducted face to face, ei-
ther at the participant’s workplace or alternative com-
munity venues between 23 May and July 2018. The
other three interviews were done over the phone. The
interviews took approximately 45 min. All interviews
were audiotaped, professionally transcribed and deiden-
tified using pseudonyms to protect participants’ confi-
dentiality. Researchers wrote field notes after each
interview to record contextual data and aid reflexive
thinking. Data collection and analysis occurred simultan-
eously. As data collection proceeded, interview tran-
scripts were reread and analysed by SJ and MC using a
thematic analysis approach. This simultaneous approach
allowed the researchers to effectively identify when data
saturation was reached, and data collection should stop.
Data collection halted at 25 interviews (7 formative, 19
summative).
Data analysis
Two researchers (SJ and MC) used inductive thematic
analysis to analyse the seven formative interview tran-
scripts and identify emerging themes. They independ-
ently coded the transcripts line by line and subsequently
met on two occasions to compare findings alongside the
corresponding rationale that they independently identi-
fied whilst reviewing the interview transcripts, and to
discuss any differences in their codes and (sub)categor-
ies. SJ and MC used the seven formative transcripts to
each develop a codebook containing code names, de-
scriptions, categories and subcategories with quotations
that illustrated each aforementioned element. These
codebooks were used to present findings that emerged
from the formative interviews to the wider team (AM
and JK) during a weekly team meeting, to inform re-
cruitment strategies and subsequent interview schedules
for the summative interviews. Weekly meetings also
resulted in the refinement and addition of new codes to
the coding frame. A similar iterative and collaborative
analytical approach was taken for the summative inter-
views. SJ and MC independently coded transcripts and
identified emerging themes. The coding and relation-
ships between themes were further discussed with the
wider study team and revised accordingly when consen-
sus on discrepancies between the coders (SJ and MC)
was met. Through this strategy common themes related
to the perceived mental health impact of the incident
and the visibility and appropriateness of the Council’s
mental health response were ascertained.
The interviews were conducted by qualified re-
searchers. The core research team composed of a psych-
ologist and three senior global public health lecturers (a
medical anthropologist and two sociologists) with com-
bined expertise in qualitative research, evaluative
methods and public health interventions development.
From a contextual perspective, the team’s collective re-
search interests in the areas of mental health and public
health, including the impact of violence on health and
health inequalities drew them to conduct this commis-
sioned qualitative evaluation. The core team (SJ, AM,
MC, and JC) had no prior relationship with Southwark
Council or the community before this work. However,
their pre-existing relationships from doing community
engaged research with North East London local groups
further motivated the team to do this important work.
Having conducted numerous research and evaluation
frameworks for several local authorities, MC was familiar
with delivering commissioned work within these set-
tings. Being London based meant the team benefitted
from local geographical knowledge which made it easier
for them to be flexible with when and where participant
interviews could take place. The team’s varied topical
and qualitative methodological expertise resulted in a
range of interpretations and reflection on the data
through a variety of perspectives. The use of such a
structured approach enabled the team to conduct a
rapid and focussed analysis [37].
Patient and public involvement
Due to the sensitive nature of this work, the researchers
worked closely with key community leaders and
Table 1 Demographic characteristics of participants (n = 19)
Characteristic Value (n(%))
Gender Male 11 (58%)
Female 8 (42%)
Ethnicity White 16 (84%)
Non-white 3 (16%)
Southwark Council employee 5 (26%)
Other i.e. police service, local mental health teams, faith leaders, headteachers, business owners, residents) 14 (74%)
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informants from Southwark Council to devise an appro-
priate data collection method, particularly the interview
questions. Southwark’s Public Health division continues
to work with local community groups to help dissemin-
ate and comment on our findings at relevant community
events.
Results
Themes that emerged from participants’ narratives were
merged into overarching categories in Fig. 2, to describe
key findings within the data. Table 2 contains anon-
ymised quotes from participants to further support find-
ings and illuminate their experiences.
The public health response
Formative interviewees reported that a Humanitarian
Assistance Steering Group (HASG) was convened by
Southwark Council in the immediate aftermath of the
incident. The HASG brought together multiple stake-
holders from the borough and wider region to develop a
humanitarian response. An early, and unusual, decision
of the HASG was to set up a Mental Health and Well-
being Sub-Group (MHWSG) co-chaired by the local
Director of Public Health and the chief executive of the
local mental healthcare organization.
At the direction of the Director of Public Health, in
the days immediately following the incident, the public
health team undertook in parallel a rapid literature re-
view which drew on expert opinion and experience from
the recent Manchester Arena attacks, and a health needs
assessment. Their review identified limited and
contradictory guidance regarding best practice in such
situations. In the most important response frameworks,
terror attacks are treated as a humanitarian emergency
that are indistinguishable from natural disasters. Al-
though exposure to natural disasters also increases risk
of adverse mental and behavioural outcomes, this over-
looks the fact that terror attacks sui generis aim to cause
long-term harm to mental health and wellbeing of
communities.
The health needs assessment drew on opinion and
perspectives from around the Council, wider stake-
holders and the community. The circumstances meant
that the needs assessment itself required a dynamic ap-
proach with the Council’s public health team describing
it as a “live document”. Three principal areas of interest
were identified: mental health and wellbeing of those af-
fected by the incident (with varying degrees of direct or
indirect involvement), economic activity (that is the
businesses affected), and broader community cohesion.
Needs were identified within hours of beginning the
needs assessment. In the absence of any existing guid-
ance, Southwark Council’s Public Health team coordi-
nated a variety of initiatives aimed at protecting and
promoting the mental health and wellbeing of people af-
fected by the attack (quote 1). An early and very prac-
tical need was to review the evidence around risk
communication so that social media messaging could be
safe and effective. A compendium of social media mes-
sages drawing on the evidence base was pulled together.
Other activities included signposting people to pre-
existing services and producing a wellbeing factsheet.
Fig. 2 Thematic map
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They also arranged mental health workshops that were
positively received by attendees from the local commu-
nity and businesses (quote 2). From our evaluation there
is evidence that the techniques used in these workshops
had a broader positive impact. For example, a local
schoolteacher used some of the techniques taught at the
workshop with her pupils.
The MHWSG oversaw the design and response of all
public health activities, whilst providing an interface
with the NHS and other community partners such as
business leaders and faith groups. This sub-group met
approximately weekly for the first month and then on a
reduced frequency, thereafter, advocating upwards to the
HASG for parity between physical and mental health re-
sponse. It also laid the groundwork for the subsequent
Outreach and Screen Programme, deploying trauma-
focused cognitive behavioural therapy and other inter-
ventions. The MHWSG stood down almost four months
after the incident. However, the Director of Public
Health continued to provide advice and leadership
around mental health and wellbeing within the HASG
for the following two years, until that group was stood
down.
Southwark Council also made efforts to protect poten-
tially vulnerable communities at a time when police re-
sources were stretched. For example, the Council
supported and reassured the Muslim community by pro-
viding CCTV surveillance around mosques at their re-
quest (quote 3).
Perceived impact on mental health and wellbeing
Interviewees highlighted numerous ways in which the
London Bridge and Borough Market attack negatively
impacted the mental health and wellbeing of people liv-
ing and/or working in the area. Overall, the attacks re-
sulted in a general sense of sadness, anxiety and fear in
the local community (quote 4).




1 I from the outset was quite concerned about the welfare of everyone who had been affected by this. Local residents, Borough Market, the
market stall holders. Folk who had witnessed this, folk who had been injured by it. I knew there was a strong international dimension from
the get-go and I wanted a safe refuge for family members coming from abroad to be able to go close to the site. To have good psycho-
logical support, good practical support. So we opened a Humanitarian Assistance Centre. (Council worker)
2 We put in place also like an information sheet which was promoted across the borough that had services for children and young people,
for parents, carers, for adults. But the workshops that people can access... so the idea was about developing toolkits, linking people with
support which is in the borough, and having that seminar to understand more what is out there. Taking that back to there, what is within
the area. (Local mental health team)
3 We used the council’s CCTV network to provide cover to faith institutions, because this was happening during Ramadan where there’s a
large amount of people out on the streets in the evening having come to and from Friday prayers in particular. They (Muslim community)
were worried about attacks against their premises, they were worried about hate crime and victimisation of their communities. (Council
worker)
4 Imagining the kind of psychological stuff, of imagining what could’ve happened to you. There’s the people who work here in the
restaurants and everything. I mean some of them saw the most horrific things and felt that their life was on the edge as they were
cowering at the back of their restaurants. And some staff had just gone because they couldn’t cope being in the place anymore.
(Community leader)
5 there were photographs in the press, where people actually have obviously used a long lens and were outside the court and from
someone’s bedroom shooting down the road (resident)
6 we were already being asked to do interviews. I say we, the authority and the leader, that kind of level to do interviews. The news is
straight on it, ain’t they? (Council worker)
7 When it comes to the women, because they use a hijab, it’s very obvious. But men, like me now, I carry my cap and put it in my pocket,
nobody will know. And when it comes to having a beard, not only Muslims have a beard. We have some non-Muslims that they just like
the beard for fashion. You understand it? So when it comes to the women they are more vulnerable (Muslim community leader)
8 Why were we locked out of our … either out or into our homes? And why was the cathedral locked down? People couldn’t access the
sacred place that’s in the middle of the community. So people were being told you can get in and turn up and told no, you can’t. It
causes frustration, it causes angst and causes just anger. I was awake all night really and discovered that the cordon was Pizza Express on
our side of Bankside. And the officers there were very clear that I wouldn’t be able to get to the cathedral. (Resident)
9 I think the people who attended [the workshops] were mostly businesses who attended. I think it would be useful for people who were
actually affected from the event, the incident, to allow them to come. (local mental health team)
10 The question I always get is how do we identify ‘vulnerables’? And we always kick back with well what’s vulnerable? Because three o’clock
in the morning, you’re chucked out on the street, you’re all vulnerable. (Council worker)
11 People who had gathered there spontaneously started to clear all the flowers after the mayor and the clergy and some people from the
mosque had begun it, everybody then joined in. And everyone cleared it themselves, the community cleared the flowers, which was
extremely cathartic. The council workers who were there to put everything into the vans, just stood there and received all the bunches
from the people and put them into the vans. And that was really, really good. (Community leader)
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A number of contextual issues were raised. Firstly, the
attacks took place in an area where lots of people from
all over the city – and the world – come to socialise.
The fact that it occurred near a major central London
railway terminus appeared to have exacerbated the feel-
ing that “it could have been me”. Conversely, it also
meant that the impacts extended well beyond the geo-
graphical confines of the borough of Southwark. For ex-
ample, none of the dead were residing within
Southwark. Reflecting the global nature of London, only
one of the eight victims and one of the three attackers
were British nationals. Secondly, the London Bridge and
Borough Market attacks came very soon after several
other terror incidents in London (Westminster Bridge
attack, three months prior) and the UK (Manchester
Arena bombing a fortnight prior). It is possible, if not
likely, that the cumulative effect of these attacks led to a
heightened sense of anxiety and fear in the general
population, as well as placing additional pressure on re-
sponse resources. Third, this particular incident received
a great deal of media attention because it occurred in a
location proximal to many UK media offices and in the
middle of a global city. Council employees and partners
reported that intrusive press coverage impacted on their
ability to respond to the attack (quotes 5 & 6).
Interviews were conducted around the first anniversary
of the attack and negative impacts on this community’s
mental health and wellbeing were still apparent. For ex-
ample, several workers in Borough Market did not at-
tend work on 3 June 2018 so they were not reminded of
the incident.
Minority groups appeared particularly negatively af-
fected. As the attackers had referred to Islam in order to
legitimise their actions, the local Muslim community
was fearful that they might become a more salient target
of hate crimes. A local Muslim community leader
expressed concern that female Muslims were especially
vulnerable because their hijabs made them easily identi-
fiable (quote 7). Two factors heightened the fears of the
local Muslim community. First, the attack occurred dur-
ing Ramadan, when the community would gather to-
gether far more often than usual. Second, there were a
number of recent terror attacks carried out by British
Muslims who had been inspired by the so-called Islamic
State (in Syria and Iraq) and came less than a month
after the Manchester Arena attack. However, it was
noted that the longstanding and strong relationship be-
tween the Muslim community and other faith communi-
ties in Southwark did help quell these concerns and
issues of community cohesion.
The impact of the police cordon on local residents and
businesses was another regularly reported issue. In the
aftermath of the attack, the needs of the police to secure
a sterile crime scene took precedence over the mental
health and wellbeing needs of the local population who
were deprived of their accommodation, sustenance, in-
come and systematic mental health support delivered by
experts.
Local people who lived within the cordon were evacu-
ated from their homes and prevented from returning
while the investigations continued. In some cases, it was
ten days before people were permitted to return home.
At a time when many residents were already feeling anx-
ious and upset, this uncertainty created additional stress
(e.g. not being able to feed pets or access possessions
needed for work). Several interviewees explained that
this issue was worsened by a perceived lack of informa-
tion from law enforcement. Even a year after the inci-
dent, resentment towards the police among local
communities was observed (quote 8).
The closing down of Borough Market resulted in a
negative economic impact on a variety of people in the
area. Business owners reported they had lost “vast
amounts of money” as they were prohibited from open-
ing for up to ten days, including two weekends. This was
particularly problematic for small business owners (who
make up a large proportion of businesses in Borough
Market). This problem was most apparent among mar-
ket traders and others who held fresh foods in stock, as
it perished while the cordon was up. Staff working
within the cordon were also affected: with no workplace,
some had no income.
Was logic underpinning the response, and its
implementation, appropriate?
Interviewees acknowledged that the Council was operat-
ing under extreme circumstances amid very little guid-
ance. Moreover, they had limited human resources and
members of the teams deployed had many other roles
and responsibilities. For example, the Council’s Emer-
gency Planning team which has statutory responsibility
to undertake specific tasks under the Civil Contingencies
Act 2004, comprises only three staff members. Like
many other council departments, Southwark’s Public
Health team re-tasked six members of staff immediately
into supporting the response. There was also an array of
other unexpected tasks that arose, for example providing
information and reassurance to local community
stakeholders.
There was an issue with lack of visibility of the re-
sponse. Only a limited number of residents were aware
of or accessed the Council signposted mental health and
wellbeing initiatives. Most stakeholder interviewees said
they did not attend the mental health workshops (quote
9). Many stakeholders reported hearing about the well-
being information sheet, but very few actually saw it. Po-
tential reasons for the low visibility include the physical
barrier of the police cordon, staff not living in the area,
Jumbe et al. BMC Public Health         (2021) 21:1427 Page 8 of 12
and the difficulty in identifying those affected due to the
transient nature of where the attack occurred.
Interviewees involved in the mental health outreach
activity highlighted the challenge of contacting affected
residents. Council workers did not have an immediately
clear understanding of who was displaced and who had
been affected. As a result, support ended up targeting
the business community (specifically the Market) rather
than residents (quote 9). A significant proportion of
people present at London Bridge and in Borough Market
on the night of the attack were not from the local area
and this was a particularly challenging and heteroge-
neous community to target. This made it difficult for
Southwark Council to trace individuals who required
support and provide it in an appropriate manner (quote
10). Another reason for this lack of visibility is poten-
tially tied to the ‘watchful waiting’ approach suggested
by the evidence on trauma used by the MHWSG.
Watchful waiting in the context of trauma exposure in-
volves carefully monitoring people’s symptoms to see
whether they improve or get worse. It is sometimes rec-
ommended because most people who develop problems
after a traumatic experience get better within a few
weeks without treatment [37]. This approach was some-
times misconstrued as the absence of a response by the
community. In the case of Southwark Council, the
watchful waiting service was commissioned in October
(post-incident), meaning only a proportion of the ex-
posed population were screened. Despite NICE guide-
lines for PTSD [38] stating the importance of screening
post major event, in reality the national health service
‘do not run a continuous service, the event takes place,
then they are making a decision if they want the service
or not. And then it takes a few months to book someone
onto the service’. This limits ability for such commis-
sioned services to effectively screen and monitor popula-
tions effectively.
Yet there were also several positively received mea-
sures that the Council took as part of their response.
They appreciated the value and need for a bottom-up
approach to encouraging community cohesion based on
the social capital and relationships already embedded in
the local community. One particularly positively ob-
served outcome was a series of organically developed
events, led by the community and supported by the
Council, which brought a diverse range of people to-
gether to reflect on the incident. A ceremonial clearing
up of flowers was a notable example of this (quote 11).
The Mayor and local religious leaders began to move
the flowers and other participants at the event and
formed a human chain to help. The Council were at the
end of the chain to respectfully place the flowers into a
van. This was interpreted by many as an act that allowed
the process of moving these offerings in a respectful
manner. It is critical to recognise that such events were
meaningful because they were driven by a number of
community leaders working together in a proactive way
to bring their local populations together.
Some members of Southwark Council had longstand-
ing and trusting relationships with various community
groups and were sources of reassurance and practical
support after the attack. However, such relationships
were not systematically engaged to enrich the response.
For example, the relationships with representative from
the local Muslim community fostered by various Council
departments were not drawn upon to maintain and nur-
ture community cohesion between different religious
groups who lived and worked in the Borough. These
stakeholder narratives suggest that local authorities
should focus on building resilience, particularly among
vulnerable populations to mitigate subsequent terror in-
cidents. When incidents do happen, they should draw
on such networks of resilience when planning and deliv-
ering a response. These same networks of resilience
could also function as a means of systematically and sen-
sitively disseminating information (i.e., the mental health
and wellbeing leaflet) to people in need.
Finally, as some interviewees pointed out, organic
community-based responses to the attacks did result in
the protection of wellbeing as they forged strong rela-
tionships between people who were affected by the har-
rowing and unique event. Again, it is important to think
about how such relationships might be nurtured in the
event of future responses.
Discussion
The attack was reported to have had a profound and
negative impact on the mental health and wellbeing of
those we interviewed and those citizens for which they
felt a responsibility for caring for in a variety of ways
similar to previous terror attacks [1, 7, 8, 19]. General
consequences included the shock and trauma of being in
close proximity to a terror attack. Context specific con-
sequences included the distress caused by businesses
having to cease trading because of the police cordon,
and the economic impact this would have on business
owners and their employees. Some of these conse-
quences were general and some were context specific.
Some impacts were in direct response to the terror at-
tack while others were borne out of the post-incident ac-
tions related to the criminal investigation, which left the
needs of residents and business unmet [39]. For ex-
ample, the police impose a cordon on the area in order
to carry out the criminal investigation. This resulted in
residents being locked out of their homes for days – and
not being able to access pets, clean clothes, and so on –
and businesses being unable to trade, so the many
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restaurants and stall around Borough Market were left
with decomposing produce that they could not sell.
Crucially, there is limited literature from a public
health governance on how to mitigate mental health and
wellbeing impacts of terror attacks, as opposed to hu-
manitarian emergencies more generally [2]. This is an
important knowledge gap given the context of terror
seeking to stoke population-level anxiety. In spite of this
gap, Southwark Council used the scant evidence avail-
able and responded to the attack with a pioneering pub-
lic health approach [4]. By developing a Health and
Wellbeing Sub-Group and deploying a dynamic health
needs assessment-based approach, Southwark’s Public
Health team were able to capture and respond to a range
of emergent needs in real-time and exploiting the
evidence-base where it was available. This approach has
highlighted a more strategic gap in emergency response
around ensuring a parity of esteem between physical and
mental health. This paper is important because it en-
ables us to learn lessons from this approach and inform
the development of guidelines for responses to future
terror attacks that take place in similar urban environ-
ments. Since the 2017 attacks, the Association of Direc-
tors of Public Health has drawn on Southwark’s
experience to issue new guidance describing a role for
public health in the acute and longer-term response.
This evaluation shows that people used signposted sup-
port services and workshops, and that Council activities
mitigated some of the negative impacts on mental health
and wellbeing driven by the terror attack.
There are important lessons that can be learned from
this evaluation. First, the value of using pre-existing so-
cial relationships to enhance reach of public health ef-
forts is critical. Pre-existing community cohesion also
allows people on the ground to come together and help
each other practically and emotionally with the Council’s
support [17]. Second, there is a serious question posed
in how to better balance the needs of criminal justice
process with the mental health and wellbeing of relevant
communities. More research is needed to understand
how these processes can be better aligned and imple-
mented alongside public health priorities in emergency
situations without undermining one another. Third,
identifying people in need was a challenge, exacerbated
by the incident affecting a high heterogeneous and mo-
bile population amid a global city. In the future, and per-
haps in partnership with locally elected politicians and
health services, the municipal government should re-
double the efforts to analyse and understand their geo-
graphical population more systematically to better iden-
tify people’s needs, particularly within vulnerable groups.
This would facilitate more focused and targeted inter-
ventions based on the needs of the community in terms
of demographics and culture. Fourth, additional work is
also needed on addressing the wellbeing needs of Coun-
cil staff and other partners who may or may not be in-
volved in the initial ‘blue-light’ response [40, 41].
Workers such as those cleansing the urban environment
from victims’ blood or repairing bullet-holes in walls are
sometimes overlooked in the immediate aftermath of
such an incident. This is particularly important when re-
sources are overstretched. This group of workers may
also relate more closely to the environment: working
there in the future unlike emergency workers drawn
from a larger area who may have only a fleeting relation-
ship with the incident zone.
Overall, four areas of learning for local government
public health responses to terror attacks have been iden-
tified in the evaluation:
1. It is necessary to undertake systematic and
appropriate identification of community mental
health and wellbeing needs at all stages of the
incident response. This process should build on
pre-existing local intelligence and involve a robust
and practical monitoring and evaluation process.
2. Strong communication between emergency services
and the Council, specifically with regard to an
awareness and management of the social and
mental health effects of their work, needs to be
enabled.
3. Collaboration and communication with pre-existing
health service mental health and other services (so-
cial care, education, housing) teams is crucial in the
targeted delivery of a mental health and wellbeing
response.
4. Strategies for monitoring and supporting the mental
health of council workers involved in recovery
activity must be embedded in local authority
responses to terrorist incidents.
Our study has several strengths including a rigorous
qualitative design, successfully engaging with key com-
munity leaders from a participant population that is his-
torically underrepresented in research (Muslim
community), and the generation of rich descriptions of
both how the Council’s public health response was deliv-
ered and the intervention’s perceived reach within the
community. By providing feedback about areas of signifi-
cance, this research will help in planning for future acts
of terrorism and/or disasters.
Study limitations include the short 3 month timescale
of the commissioned work. Three out of the 25 potential
participants did not respond to the study invitation
email and we were unable to follow them up beyond the
timelines of the commissioned work. These individuals
worked in the schools and mental health services so we
may be missing additional perspectives on how the
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terror attack affected children and their families within
the community or whether the attack changed working
conditions for those in educational and/or health set-
tings. Data saturation gave us confidence to stop inter-
viewing but we do not know whether these three
nonresponders could have provided additional perspec-
tives beyond the data collected. Extending the recruit-
ment period would have allowed us to interview
additional participants and may have elicited additional
insights. Some may argue that this research may also be
limited by recall bias because we interviewed partici-
pants a year after the incident which may affect their
recollection of events [42]. Recall is an issue for most re-
search collecting retrospective data from a specific time
point [43]. However, there was corroboration on specific
events and timelines of activities from various partici-
pant accounts. For example, several participants de-
scribed the impactful organic coming together of the
community at a religious ceremony after the attack simi-
larly. Moreover, considering the life changing experi-
ences of those we interviewed, a terror attack especially
one that took place only a year ago, is something hard to
forget. We are therefore confident that recall bias was
not an issue in our interview data [42].
Conclusion
Terror attacks are likely to remain a continued risk for
urban centres across the world. Despite governments’
best efforts to prevent attacks, increasingly a public
health approach to mental health and wellbeing will be
useful in mitigating the longer-term impact of terror.
This evaluation demonstrates the value of evidence
based-practice and public health leadership in the after-
math of a terror attack. Yet more research in this area is
needed. We propose that future management of inci-
dents of this nature will benefit from a similar approach
that enshrines parity of esteem between mental and
physical health, as well as acknowledging and mitigating
the broader challenges to population-level wellbeing,
economic risks and community cohesion.
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